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ABSTRACT
As more and more embedded devices are connected to the Inter-
net, leading to the emergence of Internet-of-Things (IoT), previ-
ously less tested (and insecure) devices are exposed to miscreants.
To prevent them from being compromised, the memory protection
unit (MPU), which is readily available on many devices, has the po-
tential to become a free lunch for the defenders. To our surprise,
the MPU is seldom used by real-world products. The reasons are
multi-fold. While there are non-technical reasons such as compati-
bility issues, more importantly,we found thatMPU brings virtually
no security enhancement at the expense of decreased performance
and responsiveness. In this work, we investigate the MPU adop-
tion in major real-time operating systems (RTOSs), in particular,
the FreeRTOS, and try to pinpoint the fundamental reasons to ex-
plain why MPU is not favored. We hope our findings can inspire
new remedial solutions to change the situation.We also review the
latest MPU design and provide technical suggestions to build more
secure embedded systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems have long been operating in a closed environ-
ment, such as industrial plants and vehicle communication sys-
tems. The reliability and robustness of such systems were persis-
tently tested in the past decades. However, these tests were con-
ducted in a benign environment. That is, it is assumed that no
adversary could actively penetrate the system. Unfortunately, this
landscape has changed as more and more embedded devices are ex-
posed to the Internet, where everyone can launch attack remotely.
Since embedded systems are typically programmed using sys-
tem programming languages such as C/C++, memory errors pose a
great threat to the security of these systems, especially considering
that many third-party libraries run at the same privilege level as
that of the core program. On the defense side, ARM, a leading chip
designer for microcontroller unit (or MCU), proposes the memory
protection unit (MPU). The MPU is a low-cost security extension
to ARM MCUs that safeguards certain sensitive memory regions
in case a piece of code is compromised. Therefore, it is a promising
mitigation technique to memory vulnerabilities. Other MCUs such
as MSP430 FRAM followed this design and implemented similar
hardware. Unfortunately, we found this technique is seldom used
in real products, although the MPU has been around for more than
two decades (since the ARMv4t architecture) and has wide adop-
tion on many devices. Our work is motivated by this observation.
We hope to find outmajor reasons to explain why theMPU has not
been popular. To do so, we investigate the usage of MPU on em-
bedded operating systems that support it. This preliminary work
reports our results on FreeRTOS, a leader in the IoT and embed-
ded system market. We found that the MPU virtually provides no
security benefit other than introducing additional overhead and
programming complexity.
2 THE MPU DESIGN
ARM is the leader in MCU design. ARM has developed quite a
number of different processor products (i.e., Application Proces-
sors (Cortex-A series), Real-time Processors (Cortex-R series) and
Micro-controller Processors (Cortex-M series)) corresponding to
different applications. Among them, Cortex-R and Cortex-M pro-
cessors are usually designed to have a much lower silicon area and
much high-energy efficiency for real-time and industrial applica-
tions. Therefore, they are very popular in the MCU, deeply embed-
ded systems, and IoT market.
Due to its cost and power-efficient design, ARMv7-M/R have
limited security feature support. By default, all the instructions run
at the same privilege level and access the same address space. As a
basic mitigation mechanism, the MPU has been provided for light-
weight access control. It allows privileged software to define mem-
ory regions and assign memory access permission (read/write/ex-
ecution) and memory attributes (ordering and caching) to each of
them. Developers need to configure two registers – Base Address
Register (BAR) and Base Attribute/Size Register (BASR).
Note that only privileged code can access these registers. If a mem-
ory access violates the access permissions, the processor generates
a HardFault. The MPU has been supported in main-stream ARM
MCUs, including Cortex-M0+/M3/M4/M7 and all Cortex-R series.
The programming model of MPU is described in the ARMv7-
M/R architecture manual. First, depending on the implementation,
an MPU can support 8-16 memory regions (Cortex-M0+/M3/M4
which are most used by current IoT MCUs only support 8 memory
regions1). Each region should be aligned. Regarding the start ad-
dress, it must start at an address of multiple of its size. Regarding
the size, it must be 1) at least 32 bytes, and 2) power of two. Thus,
when a region of arbitrary size is required, several smaller regions
have to be used to reach the target size. Second, to add flexibly
1https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-
blog/posts/arm-cortex-m3-processor-the-core-of-the-iot
Table 1: Popular RTOSs MPU adoption
RTOS MPU support Open source
FreeRTOS Optional Open-source
ARM Mbed Mandatory Open-source
Nucleus 3.X Mandatory Proprietary
Keil RTX None Proprietary
Contiki None Open-source
ThreadX None Proprietary
TinyOS None Open-source
TI-RTOS None Open-source
uC/OS-II Optional Proprietary
VxWorks Optional Proprietary
each region greater than 256 bytes can be divided into eight equally
sized sub-regions. This is achieved by configuring the sub-region
disable field (SRD) in BASR. Note that each sub-region can be indi-
vidually activated, but all still have the same permissions. Third, re-
gions can overlap, and higher numbered regions have precedence.
There is a default region with priority -1 that maps the entire phys-
ical memory. When enabled, it sets default access permissions for
privileged mode. Unprivileged modemust be explicitly set to grant
any permissions.
Adoption. Taking advantage of the MPU, embedded systems can
restrict access privilege of untrusted or error-prone code, isolate
critical services and therefore mitigate the consequences caused by
memory errors. Unfortunately, based on our our investigation, the
situation is very discouraging. In Table 1, we list the adoption of
MPU in popular market-leading RTOSs. ARM Mbed and Nucleus
3.X have integrated the MPU in their own system design in the
first place.While others, including FreeRTOS and ThreadX, add the
MPU support optionally. Other RTOSs such as Contiki, Keil RTX,
and TinyOS do not support the MPU at all. What concerns most is
that we found that real devices rarely use MPU-enabled variants.
For example, although FreeRTOS has MPU port, most manufactur-
ers choose the non-MPU version. This is evidenced by the fact that
AmazonWeb Services (AWS), which took stewardship of the FreeR-
TOS kernel in 2017, only continues to integrate its IoT libraries to
the non-MPU version of FreeRTOS.
3 MPU USAGE IN FREERTOS
Cooperating with the world’s leading chip companies, the FreeR-
TOS has become a market leading RTOS and the de-facto stan-
dard solution for many micro-controllers and small microproces-
sors in the past 15 years. Therefore, in this work, we start with
studying MPU-enable FreeRTOS. Note that the MPU is only used
in the MPU-enabled version of FreeRTOS 2 rather than the widely
adopted normal version. In the MPU-enabled version, FreeRTOS
is revised in the following ways according to the memory map as
shown in Table 2.
1. The code segment was configured to be read-only in case
code tampering. In additional, first 24K of flash is reserved for core
2 https://www.freertos.org/FreeRTOS-MPU-memory-protection-unit.html
Table 2:MemoryMapofMPU-enabledFreeRTOSonARMv7-
M3/4
Region No. Base Size Usage
Permission
Mode
Access
Attributes
0 0x0 2GB Code Segment
Privilege
User
rx
rx
1 0x0 24kB Kernel APIs
Privilege
User
rx
∅
2 0x20000000 512B Kernel data
Privilege
User
rwx
rx
3 0x40000000 2GB Standard Peripherals
Privilege
User
rw
rw
4 Stack Bottom Stack Depth User Stack
Privilege
User
rwx
rwx
5-7 User-defined User-defined User-defined
Privilege
User
User-defined
Memory regions which are unmapped by any MPU region falls in the default region, which can
accessed in privileged mode only.
FreeRTOS APIs as the second MPU region. It is set to be read-only
in privileged mode, and inaccessible in unprivileged mode.
2. The kernel maintained data (e.g., current control block) are
located in a separated 512B region in RAM which is readable or
writable only in privileged mode by kernel.
3. By default, standard peripherals (e.g., UARTs) could be read
or written in unprivileged mode.
4. Tasks can be created to run in either privileged mode or un-
privileged mode (user mode). A separated RAM region is reserved
for each user mode task and is inaccessible from any other tasks.
A Privileged mode task can set itself into User mode, but once in
User mode it cannot set itself back to Privileged mode.
5. The remaining three regions can be defined by user mode
tasks individually.
6. A memory address like system peripherals (e.g., system timer,
Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC), MPU registers, etc.)
in private peripheral bus (PPB) space which are not mapped by
any MPU region falls in the default region, which can accessed in
privileged mode only.
4 PITFALLS OF MPU-ENABLED FREERTOS
We found that the protection implemented in MPU-enable FreeR-
TOS is incomplete and can be bypassed easily. Moreover, the intro-
duced overhead makes it unsuitable in many scenarios.
Vulnerable Memory Isolation The aforementioned memory iso-
lation can be easily bypassed. Since FreeRTOS APIs are located
in a region that can only be accessed in privileged mode, a task
has to raise its privilege temporarily if it needs to invoke a ker-
nel API. This is achieved by the xPortRaisePrivilege function
(vPortResetPrivilege to drop the privilege). For example, as shown
in listing 1, if a user mode task needs memory from the heap, it has
to invoke MPU_pvPortMalloc which uses xPortRaisePrivilege
function to switch to privilegemode before invoking the FreeRTOS
kernel function pvPortMalloc. On the completion of pvPortMalloc,
it needs to drop the privilege by invoking vPortResetPrivilege.
Since firmware binaries embed all the static compiled program
as well as FreeRTOS AIPs, function xPortRaisePrivilege can
be easily located via reverse-engineering. Once attacker is able to
carry out control flow hijacking attack (e.g., by exploiting a mem-
ory error) on any user mode task, the hijacked task can directly
escalate privilege via invoking xPortRaisePrivilege and never
drop the privilege. With the escalated privilege, the hijacked task
can access any resources on the device.
To verify our observation, we artificially built a firmware with
a stack overflow bug, and then exploited this bug to launch a clas-
sical control flow hijacking attack. Specifically, the original return
address on the stack is overwritten by the address of the function
xPortRaisePrivilege. As a result, the executing privilege has
been escalated. Combining more sophisticated ROP programming,
we were able to take over the control flow with elevated privilege.
This has been verified by our experiments and others [7]. Ironically,
FreeRTOS intends to leverage MPU to protect kernel code from
memory errors. However, improper protection to xPortRaisePrivilege
itself deconstructs the boundary between the task code and kernel
code. In other words, if there is a memory error, the added security
can be bypassed completely.
void *MPU_pvPortMalloc( size_t xSize )
{
void *pvReturn ;
BaseType_t xRunningPrivileged = xPortRaisePrivilege();
pvReturn = pvPortMalloc( xSize );
vPortResetPrivilege( xRunningPrivileged );
return pvReturn ;
}
Listing 1: pvPortMalloc function in MPU-enable FreeRTOS
Conflict with Exiting System Design Second, due to MPU in-
tegration, some existing mechanisms are diminished or even be-
come incompatible. For example, user mode tasks cannot use dy-
namic queues because there is no shared memory between any two
tasks. To overcome this, a task has to allocate memory statically
and shares it with the peers by configuring an MPU region. Note
that each peer needs an same MPU region for each queue. In ad-
dition, semaphore is also a special kind of queue (Its queue length
is one). As a result, if a task needs multiple queues or semaphore,
MPU resources soon become exhausted (there are only three free
MPU regions for user mode tasks to use).
Incomplete ProtectionTheMPU-enable FreeRTOS is coarse-grained
and inflexible. First, standard peripherals are not protected by de-
fault. Although there are three remaining MPU regions can be
configured individually by each user mode task, they are not suit-
able for protecting several separated small peripheral regions due
to the alignment problem and limited number of MPU regions as
mentioned in Section 2. For instance, the memory map for Audio
peripheral on MPS2+ FPGA prototyping system broad (AN386) is
0x40024000-0x40024FFF (16 Bytes). However, the least length of
MPU region is 32 bytes.
Second, Since FreeRTOS are located in the region that can only
be accessed in privileged mode, a task has to raise its privilege tem-
porarily if it needs to invoke a kernel API. On the other hand, de-
velopers have the demand to assign separate access rights to in-
terrupt handlers [2]. However, NVIC registers are located in the
system peripheral region which can only be accessed in privilege
mode unless MPU is disabled during interrupt handling.
Increased Overhead The “protection” provided by the MPU in-
curs too much overhead. This is because each invocation to kernel
API has to go through a full privilege switch. Since kernel API is fre-
quently invoked in tasks, this poses significant impact on real-time
performance. Our experiment shows that one thousand privilege
switch takes 3.5ms in average on MPS2+ FPGA prototyping sys-
tem broad (AN386) with 25MHZ CPU clock frequency. In a previ-
ous research [4], similar result was obtained. In addition, the MPU
regions of each task is different from each other, so MPU regions
have to be reconfigured during task switch, which will also cause
time delay.
5 WHY THE MPU HAS BECOME AN
OUTCAST
There are multiple reasons that makeMPU less attractive. We sum-
marizes the most important ones based on our observations/exper-
iments.
Non-technical Reasons. First, IoT devices are low-cost energy-
efficient devices. If more transistors are reserved for complex secu-
rity features, not only the price of SoC could be raised accordingly,
but also increased power consumption rules out many applications
in which thermal design power (TDP) concerns.
Second, as IoT business continues to grow, manufacturers are
facing increased time-to-market pressure. Although security is a
concern, manufacturers tend to reuse existing code base, which is
obsolete and less tested on the Internet. At the same time, IoT ap-
plications are becoming more and more Moreover, developing new
software leveraging MPU may cause compatibility issues. This is
clearly shown in the case of MPU-eabled FreeRTOS and other de-
veloper forums [3]. In summary, if existing code works, few com-
panies are willing to harm the profit by investing on security.
TechnicalReasons.TheMPU is a trimmed down version ofMMU.
Can we directly borrow the design of MMU to replace MPU? We
believe this is infeasible due to two reasons. Except for the afore-
mentioned cost issue, MPU actually benefits very little from ad-
vanced features available on MMU. For example, paging which is
the underlying technology of virtual memory, is used in a batch
of security solutions. Whereas in MCU, paging is an overkill be-
cause the RAM in an MCU never exceeds several megabyte. The
benefit of virtual memory is substantially diminished. Supporting
paging or not becomes a dilemma and ARM obviously chooses not
to support it.
Incorporating security checking for each memory access and
frequent privilege switches (as is done in MPU-enabled FreeRTOS)
inevitably introduce performance overhead. As shown in Section 4,
the performance is so significant that real time constraints cannot
be met in some scenarios [4]. There are two major sources of ad-
ditional overhead. First, each task switch requires MPU reconfig-
uration. Second, each hardware interrupt or invocation of kernel
API require privilege escalation. This rules out the MPU in many
real-time applications.
6 SUGGESTIONS
We propose technical suggestions of building securer embedded
systems and review the latest secure embedded system design.
6.1 MPU Revision in ARMv8-M
ARMhas already acknowledged the problemswithARMv7-MMPU
by revising it in ARMv8-M. However, it onlymitigates the problem
rather than solving it. The most noticeable improvements include
increased region number (as many as 16) and more flexible region
alignment. As a result, MPU registers can be used more efficient to
meet the requirement of different region sizes.
Using Start and Limit (end) address to define memory regions
simplifies memory region definition and leads to a more efficient
use of available memory space. As mentioned in Section 2, when a
region of arbitrary size was required, several smaller regions had
to be used to reach the target size in ARMv7-M, while ARMv8-M
just need one region.
6.2 Suggestions
Better Usage of MPU.A serious limitation with MPU is that only
limited number of regions are supported.We found that creatively
using sub-region disable field (SRD) in BASR can make MPU more
efficient. As mentioned in Section 2, each memory region can be
divided into eight sub-regions, which can be enabled/disabled in-
dividual. Suppose a developer needs to allocate a 5KB region and a
3KB region for two tasks. Without sub-region, the developer has to
configure two regions of 8KB and 4KB separately. There is a waste
of 3KB and 1KB memory space correspondingly. With sub-region,
the same 8KB region can be shared between the two tasks. Specifi-
cally, when running task one, MPU is configured so that the high-
est three sub-regions of the 8KB region are disabled.When running
task two, MPU is configured so that the lowest two sub-regions of
the 8KB region are disabled. In this way, the 8KB memory block is
reused by the two tasks without wasting any memory.
In addition, it is a common practice that same kinds of peripher-
als (e.g., UART0 and UART1) have adjacent and same size memory
region. Thus, developer can use a large region to cover adjacent
and same size peripherals memory region. If several nearby pe-
ripherals need to be protected (i.e., only can be access in privilege
mode), the developer can just disable these correspond sub-regions
when running usemode tasks. Note that above approach is still not
able to protect several peripheral memory regions which far from
each other.
Software Workaround. Before a better MPU is proposed, on the
one hand, we should continue to improve coding quality to avoid
program bugs; one the other hand, we can resort to software solu-
tions. Some previous researches [1, 4] propose to use static analysis
and recompile the firmware to achieve more effective MPU usage.
For example, MINION [4] uses k-means clustering to group mem-
ory sections having similar access permissions together to mini-
mize the number of required MPU regions. It also configures MPU
during task switches to avoid privilege escalation requests.
Hardware Retrofit. Although, ARMv8-M provide more power-
ful MPU design, it can not fundamentally solve the problems we
mentioned in Section 4. In the long term, we expect a redesigned
architecture that fundamentally addresses the illustrated insecu-
rity and inflexibility in a lightweight way. Along this direction,
hardware-based solutions have been proposed [5, 6]. Themost rep-
resentative work is TrustLite[5]. It is a radical hardware redesign
that efficiently implements many novel security primitives (e.g.,
execution-aware MPU, secure loader) for embedded devices. In ad-
dition, ARMv8-M architecture extends TrustZone technology to
Cortex-M series processors for incremental security enhancement.
In particular, existing embedded software does not need heavy re-
engineering but still benefits from a trusted execution domain.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to answer the question of why the MPU, as
a ready-to-use security feature for protecting ARM-based MCUs,
has been largely ignored by both device manufacturers and RTOS
communities. We use MPU-enabled FreeRTOS as a concrete exam-
ple to showcase how the claimed security benefits brought byMPU
can be bypassed or undermined. Although FreeRTOS cannot rep-
resent all the embedded OSs, we believe our observations apply to
other OSs because the demonstrated pitfalls root in the fundamen-
tal design drawbacks of MPU. We forecast what future MPU will
be like and also provide technical suggestions to safeguard legacy
devices.
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